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This paper investigates the impact of the exchange rate regime on the current account 
adjustment process. In a first step, the present analysis assesses previous empirical work 
supporting the predominant view that more flexible exchange rate regimes facilitate current 
account adjustments. Using a FGLS estimator with fixed effects and panel corrected standard 
errors, the author draws upon the methodological approaches of two pertinent papers. The 
data set encompasses data for 171 countries for the 1970 to 2008 period. According to the 
fixed effects estimations, evidence in favor of the “conventional wisdom” does not prove to 
be robust. After pointing out fundamental weaknesses of the fixed effects estimator within 
this context, the author performs a dynamic panel estimation using a System GMM estimator 
fully developed in Blundell and Bond (1998). The results of this approach stand in contrast to 
the previous estimations, providing solid empirical evidence in favor of the predominant 
view. A monotonic relationship between exchange rate regime flexibility and the rate of 
current account reversion can be observed, indicating faster current account convergence for 
more flexible regimes. By employing an estimator that is more germane to the issue under 
investigation, the paper fills an important gap between economic common sense and its 
underlying empirics. 
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Rate Regime Flexibility 
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Introduction 
 
This paper investigates the impact of the exchange rate regime on the current account 
adjustment process. It contributes to a debate that has experienced particular great attention 
throughout the past years, namely the issue of global imbalances.
1 An overwhelmingly large 
U.S. balance of payments deficit and concomitant seemingly ever-increasing Asian surpluses 
in the years preceding the 2007-2010 crisis are the main characteristics of a situation that has 
been considered to be of great importance for the world economy and its stability in 
particular. What is more, in the wake of economic hardship facing Portugal, Italy, Greece, and 
Spain (unamiably known as the PIGS), European imbalances have become an intensely 
disputed issue. Macroeconomists have not yet formed a consensus on whether the continued 
existence of global imbalances is driving the world economy towards another global crisis. 
The discussion about how to evaluate the impacts of today’s current account surpluses and 
deficits, which have changed only in magnitudes, but remained fundamentally unchanged 
with respect to their composition since the outbreak of the crisis, has still not come to an end.
2  
 
One of the more basic points in the discussion focuses on the relationship between the 
exchange rate regime and the balance of payments of a country. Whereas the theoretical 
literature on potential equilibria of global imbalances itself is fairly extensive,
3 the empirical 
research on the impact of the exchange rate regime on the return of the current account to its 
long-term equilibrium has been comparably little until recently. Moreover, what might be the 
most puzzling feature is the fact that the basic findings of the existing literature have been 
fundamentally contradictory and therefore, largely inconclusive for the most part. In a 
situation where a remarkable frequency of calls for a more flexible Chinese exchange rate 
regime can be observed, because this would lead to an abatement of global imbalances, this 
state of indecisiveness raises reason for concern. The predominant view that exchange rate 
flexibility facilitates current account adjustments is not nearly as much buttressed by 
empirical research as one might assume. Looking at these popularly promulgated policy 
                                                 
1  In the literature, there is no clear-cut definition of the term of an external balance (see for instance: Krugman 
and Obstfeld 2009, p. 504). The present paper adopts the explication laid out in Bracke et al (2008) 
characterizing global imbalances to be “external positions of systematically important economies that reflect 
distortions or entail risks for the global economy.” 
2   See for instance: Aisen and Eterovic (2010), Baldwin (2009), Baldwin and Taglioni (2009), Blanchard and 
Milesi-Feretti (2009), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009), and Wolf (2010). Bibow (2006) represents an early work 
addressing issues in the European Union. 
3  Examples are Batini et al. (2009), Faruqee et al. (2006), Gust et al. (2008), and Meredith (2007).   3
statements, the present paper mitigates this deficiency by providing new systematic evidence 
in favor of this position while drawing upon previous work that is pertinent to the question.  
 
The paper contributes to the discussion in three important ways. First, it provides a 
comprehensive juxtaposition of the empirical research that has been carried out so far. 
Secondly, the present study makes two antagonistic papers by Chinn and Wei (2009) on the 
one hand, and by Herrmann (2009) on the other hand, more comparable. By adopting a 
methodology that is orientated at Herrmann’s work while applying it to a substantially larger 
data set that is similar to the one originally scrutinized by Chinn and Wei, it enables a better 
assessment of the issue under consideration. Since the data set comprises data for 171 
countries for the 1970 to 2008 period, previous results can be tested on a large scale.
4  
Thirdly, the paper argues for an alternative approach that seems to be more germane to the 
estimated relationship. Here, the inherent weaknesses of the fixed effects estimator to deal 
with the endogeneity issue motivates the author to adopt a System generalized method of 
moments (GMM) estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). The results of both 
estimations are presented in order to draw conclusions for the ongoing debate on global 
imbalances. It is important to note, however, that this paper is confined to discuss the impact 
of the exchange rate regime on the accumulation of current account surpluses and deficits that 
could eventually lead to global imbalances which pose systemic risks to the world economy. 
If any, the reader will find only indicative points on the assessment of global imbalances as a 
reason for concern or as a natural outcome of global economic and financial integration. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 demonstrates the 
underlying motivation for this paper and reviews the existing literature. A sufficiently detailed 
summary of the two contrary views, as well as a short account of their methodological 
differences is presented. Chapter 3 lays out the data and demonstrates the construction of the 
exchange rate regime variable. While chapter 4 introduces the econometric model of interest, 
the empirical results are displayed in the fifth part of the paper. After the results are laid out 
and discussed, Chapter 6 concludes.  
 
                                                 
4    Whereas Chinn and Wei’s (2009) data encompasses over 170 countries for the 1971 to 2005 period, 
Herrmann’s (2009) data set contains only information for 11 catching-up countries from central, eastern and 
south-eastern Europe between 1994 and 2007.   4
1.  Motivation 
 
1.1. A Brief Look at History 
 
In a global world, there is no reason for current accounts to be balanced. Deficits as 
well as surpluses are neither intrinsically good nor bad. Not allowing for departure from 
current account equilibrium would inhibit countries to gain from inter-temporal trade and 
prevent that the world’s capital concentrates in those areas with the most profitable 
investments. Therefore, it is in the common interest of countries to permit a certain degree of 
imbalances in the world economy. Indeed, it is desirable for saving to go where it is most 
productive, and large external positions can therefore emerge naturally from differences in 
saving behavior, in the rate of return on capital, or in the degree of risk or liquidity of 
different assets. Imbalances are not prima facie bad, since they may reflect the optimal 
allocation of capital across time and space. 
 
Notwithstanding, as laid out by Blanchard and Milesi-Feretti (2009), there are 
imbalances that are not fully justified by these kinds of structural factors, but are rather the 
symptoms of underlying distortions. In cases where they represent deviations from 
equilibrium, it is desirable to find ways of reducing global imbalances in order to prevent 
tensions in the world economy or even financial crises. At this point, the view that exchange 
rate flexibility facilitates current account adjustments has been predominant. If we have a look 
at history, it is very easy to find examples, where the pegging of the exchange rate seems to 
have been conducive to the accumulation of substantial current account surpluses and deficits, 
some of which represented apparent deviations from the equilibrium.  
 
To name only three pertinent examples, the phase from 1870 to 1914 is very likely to 
have been the earliest instance where external assets and liabilities piled up very fast under the 
inflexible exchange rate regimes of the gold standard, thereby giving way to persisting current 
account imbalances (Meissner and Taylor 2006, p. 22). At the peak level, current account 
surpluses in Britain amounted to 9% of GDP with similar figures for France, Germany and the 
Netherlands. As a share of GDP, these magnitudes are unmatched until the present day.
5 A 
second example represents the attempt to restore the gold standard after World War I. Most of 
the countries returned to gold convertibility at misaligned exchange rates. Britain’s exchange 
rate proved to be overvalued while other countries such as France and Germany pegged their 
                                                 
5 See Bordo (2005) for details.   5
rate at an undervalued level. During the years that followed, Britain ran chronic balance of 
payments deficits, whereas France and Germany’s surpluses were considered to be the 
corollary of their reluctance to let their price levels rise. Thirdly, and probably the most 
interesting example, is the case of Japan during the era of the Bretton Woods system. This 
instance is particularly instructive, because it appears to share important similarities with the 
Chinese situation in today’s world economy. Japan, being committed to a strategy of export-
led growth, deliberately adopted an exchange rate at an undervalued level.
6 Because of its 
increased international competitiveness on the traded goods market, a substantial current 
account surplus accrued. Japan’s strategy seemed to be a good way of ongoing economic 
growth since its growth rates ranked extraordinarily high during that time. However, the 
chronic current account surplus eventually caused tensions with foreigners and enforced 
inflationary pressures through capital inflows. This made the upholding of the peg at the 
given rate increasingly difficult. Japanese authorities were reluctant to give in to the growing 
pressure for a revaluation because they feared to mess with a strategy that had served them 
well. Not before the gold window was closed, thereby marking the collapse of Bretton Woods 
order, the yen was allowed to appreciate. 
 
Two implications of the examples are: first, that the largest imbalances ever measured 
took place under a system of fixed exchange rates, and second, that the strategy of pegging its 
exchange rate to boost trade – thereby widening the trade balance – has been a popular 
strategy for decades. Both facts provide reason to believe in the validity of the “conventional 
wisdom”. Instances where inflexible exchange rates go hand in hand with the accumulation of 
large deficits and surpluses have not been infrequent in earlier periods and support the 
predominant view that fixed exchange rates are conducive to the build-up of imbalances. 
Obviously, these historical considerations are suggestive, but unsatisfactory. They do not 
offer any proof for a systematic causality we are interested in. Henceforth, it is the ambition 





                                                 
6 By export-led growth the author means a policy strategy that relies on an undervalued exchange rate coupled 
with measures to compress domestic demand, thus preventing “overheating” and real appreciation through 
inflation.   6
1.2. Literature Review 
 
Opinions on the feasibility of today’s imbalances are numerous: reaching from the 
accentuation of the risk for “sustained deviations from equilibrium” (Bracke et al. 2008, p. 
11), over the view of the situation as an informal “Bretton Woods II” agreement where the 
current pattern would be optimal for all participants (e.g. Dooley et al. 2003), to the point of a 
complete negation of imbalances “once capital flows are endogenized as risk-adjusted returns 
and diversification opportunities” (Xafa 2007, p. 795), only the great importance of the 
phenomenon seems to be unanimous. Considering the extent of the literature on global 
imbalances together with the far-reaching consequences they might entail for the world 
economy, it is particularly surprising that the empirical literature on the impact of the 
exchange rate regime falls so significantly behind theoretical analyses of the phenomenon.  
 
According to economic theory, catch-up economies tend to experience a real 
exchange-rate appreciation in the long run. Since productivity is growing relatively fast, 
currency appreciation is needed to prevent disequilibrium between the growth of exports and 
imports through a higher command of consumers over traded goods. When a country pegs its 
exchange rate, this mechanism is suppressed. As a result, market pressures bottle up. This 
reasoning leads to the conclusion that inflexible exchange rates tend to promote the 
accumulation of imbalances that may entail deviations from market equilibrium.
7 The first 
ones to study this relationship empirically have been Chinn and Wei (2009), who drew the 
conclusion that there would not be a significant difference in the current account adjustment 
process with regard to the flexibility of the exchange rate regime, thereby contrasting the 
predominant view that greater flexibility would be conducive to these adjustments. Using 
variations of a basic autoregression, they estimate the rate at which current account balances 
revert to their mean values. The two authors scrutinize a data set encompassing data for over 
170 countries over the 1971 – 2005 period. For our discussion, it is important to note that they 
employ two de facto exchange rate regime indices that are codified as discrete variables. Due 
to the absence of persuasive empirical evidence for the position that exchange rate flexibility 
really facilitates current account adjustment, they claim that “the policy recommendation for a 
more flexible exchange rate regime in pursuit of current account adjustment is a faith-based 
initiative – based on something widely assumed to be true, actively peddled to the countries as 
a truth, but with little solid empirical support” (2009, p. 1). In total, they do not find any 
                                                 
7See for instance: Eichengreen (2008), p. 215   7
strong or robust evidence of a monotonic relationship between the exchange rate regime and 
the speed of current account adjustments.  
 
Following, Herrmann (2009) finds the contrary, i.e. that flexible exchange rate 
regimes do indeed exhibit less current account persistence than others. Even though Herrmann 
explicitly refers to the work of Chinn and Wei, the two papers are hard to compare since they 
consider data sets which differ greatly in size and scope while adopting different model 
specifications. Herrmann uses data for eleven European countries between 1994 and 2007 
only. Another decisive difference is the way of how the exchange rate regime is determined. 
While Chinn and Wei (2009, p. 13) conclude that their findings would be “independent of 
which de facto exchange rate regime classification scheme” they use, Herrmann (2009, p. 17) 
points out that “the way the exchange rate regime is measured has an important bearing on the 
outcome.” These contrary evaluations might be due to the different ways of classifying the 
exchange rate regime. Chinn and Wei rely on two different de facto exchange rate 
categorizations expressed by dummies, whereas Herrmann utilizes a continuous variable that 
measures the volatility of the nominal exchange rate as a proxy for different regimes. This 
paper aims to shed light on whether findings are caused by the different ways of classifying 
the exchange rate regime or if the country samples matter.  
 
2.  Data 
 
In this paper, the author uses data for 171 countries for the 1970 to 2008 period. Data 
on the current account, trade, and inflation rates are obtained from the World Bank’s “World 
Development Indicators (2008)”. Moreover, the present study employs the Chinn/Ito index 
“KAOPEN” of financial liberalization (Chinn and Ito 2008) as variable specifying financial 
openness. The exchange rate variable is constructed from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics as demonstrated in the next paragraph.
8 
 
Chinn and Wei employ two popular de facto classifications. Basically, their analysis 
relies on a categorization developed by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003a) and codifies it 
as a polychotomously ordered variable (ranging from 0 – 3; original index: 1 – 5). They check 
their results by operating the same regressions with an aggregated version of the Reinhart and 
                                                 
8 A comprehensive overview of the variables and the data sources can be found in Annex A.    8
Rogoff (2004) measure (ranging from 1 – 3; original index: 1 – 14). For the question under 
consideration, using discrete variables might be a too crude distinction. Pointing in the same 
direction, Herrmann indicates in her work that the original Reinhart and Rogoff index with a 
range from 1 to 14 “seems to be more adequate than the RR 3 which is used by Chinn and 
Wei to measure the exchange rate regime” (2009, p. 14). The present empirical analysis 
adopts the same measure that is also being used by Herrmann. The z-score measure proposed 
by Ghosh et al. (2003) expresses the behavior of the exchange rate regime by computing a 







where  it is the arithmetic mean of the average monthly percent changes of the nominal 
effective exchange rate of country i in year t, and  it is the standard deviation of the monthly 
percent changes of the nominal effective exchange rate for country i in year t. The volatility 




  The author uses data on the nominal effective exchange rate from the IMF’s 
Information Notification System of the “International Financial Statistics” database and 
computes the necessary components for 171 countries for the 1970 to 2008 period.
10 At the 
outset, we expect higher volatility degrees for more flexible regimes. In order to proof this 
assumption and to demonstrate that this measure does not stand in contrast to other 
classifications, the following part of the paper scrutinizes the exchange rate volatility 
according to the regime for the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (LYS) de facto classification 
used by Chinn and Wei, and a de jure measure provided in Ghosh et al. (2003). De jure 
classifications emphasize the importance of public pronouncements as signal for the private’s 
sectors expectations. Unlike de facto classifications, they have the strength of conveying 
                                                 
9 One might claim that account balances are determined by real factors, most notably the real exchange rate 
instead of the nominal one. Note that, as we are concerned with adjustment dynamics, the real exchange rate – 
taking into consideration multiple price rigidities – in the short run may depend predominantly on nominal 
exchange rate movements. As a result, the exchange rate regime could indeed affect current account 
adjustment. 
10  In order to double-check the data, the author compares his results with the ones by Ghosh et al. (2003) who 
make the z-score measure and its components available for 167 countries from 1970 to 1999. Herrmann’s z-
score data is only displayed in diagrams what makes it hard to replicate the results, due to the relatively inexact 
information. 
(1)   9
information on future policy intentions, thereby capturing signaling functions of announced 
regime choices – something which lies at the core of much modern thinking about the effect 
of regimes.
11 De facto classifications have a backward-looking nature. They, in turn, perform 
much better in detecting the sizable numbers of the so-called “soft pegs” and “hard floats”. 
While the former term relates to cases where the central bank does not take its commitment to 
defend the parity very seriously, the latter refers to cases where the exchange rate is officially 
floating, but the central bank nevertheless intervenes heavily in the foreign exchange rate 
markets. Because of these structural differences, it is instructive to check one measure for 
each of the two different types of classification. In a first step, figure 1 shows the density 
histograms for both measures. In order to compare them more easily, they are both shown 
with the same range (where “0” denotes floating, “1” intermediate, and “2” fixed regimes). 
 
Figure 1: Density Distributions of the De Jure (Ghosh) and De Facto Measure (LYS) 
 
   
 
Source: Ghosh et al. (2003) and Levy-Yeyati Sturzenegger (2003a) 
 
The basic distribution is replicated for both the de jure and the de facto classification. 
While the fixed category is by far the largest of the three, including about 2500 observations, 
the other two categories contain similar numbers of observations, showing only a small 
difference between the two classifications. Moving on, figure 2 shows the median z-scores of 
the different regimes for both measures. For both classifications the median z-score increases 
with greater exchange rate flexibility, i.e. for a greater number of observations the nominal 
effective exchange rate volatility is higher for more flexible regimes.
12 As a consequence, the 
                                                 
11 Cf. Ghosh et al. (2003), p. 42 
12 The same pattern holds true for the LYS measure with a range from 0 to 3 as can be seen in figure 3 in Annex 
B. The means do not show strictly increasing values according to regime fixity for the LYS classification as 
can bee seen in figure 4 in the Annex. If we consider the box plots, however, we see that its mean is biased by   10
assumption that the values of our regime variable increases when moving from fixed to 
floating is justified. So even if one employs the continuous exchange rate variable instead of 
the more commonly used discrete classifications, one should not come to fundamentally 
different conclusions because of this difference. It is rather the case that one is able to 
measure the relationship more accurately due to the finer distinction.  
 





3.  Model Specifications 
 
3.1. Basic Model 
 
In order to address the question of how robust previous empirical results have been 
and to what extent they can be explained either by the selection of the sample size or their 
methodological approach, the paper first considers a model that stands in line with the one 
employed by Chinn and Wei (2009). It estimates the rate at which current account balances 
revert to their mean values, but uses the continuous exchange rate volatility measure instead 
of dummy variables. The data set encompasses data for 171 countries for the 1970 to 2008 
period. The panel is unbalanced, with some countries having more observations than others. 
The approach is based on estimating the following equation:  
 
CAit = 0 + 1CAit-1 + β1Regimeit + β2CAit-1*Regimeit + εit 
 
                                                                                                                                                          




LYS   11
where  CA is the current account as percent of GDP, 1  the autoregressive coefficient
13, 
Regime is the exchange rate volatility measure and εit the error term. The country is indicated 
by the subscript i (see the Annex for a list of countries) and the year by subscript t.  
In general, this approach assumes that there exists a country-specific long-run 
equilibrium for the current account and it is equivalent to its mean value. The adjustment 
process, therefore, consists in the return of the current account from any default value to its 
mean. However, the present model does not impose the requirement that the mean of the 
current account as percent of GDP must be equal to zero. As a consequence of this 
specification, it allows current account positions that are due to cross-country differences in 
saving patterns, investment patterns, and portfolio choices, thereby representing natural 
reflections of differences in levels of development or demographic patterns rather than 
imbalances that are caused by domestic and/or international distortions. 
 
The basic model focuses exclusively on the impact of the exchange rate regime on the 
reversion of the current account balance. Thus, the coefficient of interest is β2, since it 
measures the difference in the adjustment process with regard to the degree of exchange rate 
flexibility. The present paper tests the null hypothesis that a more flexible exchange rate 
regime facilitates current account adjustment. If the “conventional wisdom” proves to be true, 
this would have to be displayed by a negative coefficient for β2, as exchange rate volatility 
increases with the degree of exchange rate regime flexibility and current account persistence 
should decrease with increasing volatility. As we are not concerned with the level of the 
current account, the exchange rate regime variable itself is not meaningful and should not be 
interpreted. Reasons for its inclusion are primarily technical. 
 
3.2. Augmented Model 
 
For robustness checks, equation (2) is augmented by including supplementary control 
variables throughout the course of our study. When we allow for these additional potential 
determinants of the rate of current account reversion, the model takes the form as follows:  
 
CAit = 0 + 1CAit-1 + β1Regimeit + β2CAit-1*Regimeit +  
β3Tradeit + β4Financeit+ β5Inflationit + 
                                                 
13 An autoregressive term of order one is sufficient for the annual data used in this work as shown by Chinn and 
Wei (2009, p. 3). 
(3)   12
 β6CAit-1*Tradeit + β7CAit-1*Financeit + β8CAit-1*Inflationit + εit 
 
where Trade is the sum of exports and imports as percent of GDP, Finance a measure of 
financial openness and Inflation the inflation rate as measured by annual consumer prices.  
  A reasonable expectation for the trade variable is that the coefficient has a negative 
sign. The intuition behind this assumption is that greater trade openness might lead to faster 
reactions of the trade balance to real exchange rate changes, thereby causing a faster return of 
the current account to its equilibrium. On the contrary, one might hypothesize that financial 
openness makes a country more prone to financial shocks, which would result in more 
frequent current account deviations from its stable level. Thirdly, we would want to check 
whether the inflation rate has an impact on our results, since pegging the exchange rate as a 
nominal anchor to reduce inflation rates remains popular.
14  
 
3.3. Lagging endogenous variables 
 
Following Herrmann, the present paper deals with the issue of endogeneity in the 
model by lagging all variables that involve our exchange rate measure.
15 Next to the different 
exchange rate regime variable, this represents another methodological divergence of the two 
papers. The rationale for this step is that one cannot preclude the possibility that causality 
works in both directions. The exchange rate volatility is likely to be also a function of the 
current account and, thus, not strictly exogenous. This is especially the case if a volatility 
variable is employed for the assessment of the exchange rate regime. In times of rapid current 
account adjustment, higher exchange rate volatility may be observed. When this modification 
is incorporated, we obtain the following equation for the basic model: 
 
CAit = 0 + 1CAit-1 + β1Regimeit-1  + β2CAit-1*Regimeit-1 + εit 
 
For the augmented model, the paper follows Herrmann and lags additionally the variables for 
trade and financial openness, since a certain degree of endogeneity might be present in these 
variables, as well: 
                                                 
14 See for instance Keller and Richardson (2003), Mishkin (2007a), p. 227 ff., and Mishkin (2007b), p. 11f. 
15 Chinn and Wei also address the issue of endogeneity in their work. In contrast to the way this part of the paper 
takes care of the issue, they examine whether their conclusions are robust to endogeneity concerns using a 
two-step procedure. In a first step, they estimate a probit model for each indicator variable (i.e. for every 
regime of the LYS measure). Afterwards, they use the predicted regime variables instead of the actual ones for 
their estimations. They report no differences between this estimation method and the one adopted in equations 
(2) and (3) of the present study (see Chinn and Wei 2009, p. 10f.). 
(4)   13
 
CAit = 0 + 1CAit-1 + β1Regimeit-1 + β2CAit-1*Regimeit-1 +  
β3Tradeit-1 + β4Financeit-1+ β5Inflationit + 
 β6CAit-1*Tradeit-1 + β7CAit-1*Financeit-1 + β8CAit-1*Inflationit + εit 
In the following section, the paper starts discussing the empirics that are helpful in 
answering the question of whether there is a difference for the current account adjustment 
process with regard to the exchange rate regime. 
 
4.  Empirical Results 
 
4.1. Preliminary Considerations 
 
A first indicative step is to look at the random effects autoregressions when the sample 
is stratified according to the already established classifications from above, i.e. the de facto 
LYS measure and the de jure measure by Ghosh. Table 1 reports the results for the degree of 
current account persistency according to the regime. Robust standard errors are displayed in 
brackets. 
 
Table 1: Current Account Persistence According to the Ghosh and LYS Classification – 
Random Effects Panel Estimation 
 
  
Ghosh (de jure) 
 
 


























































Notes: Dependent Variable: Current Account as % of GDP, *significant at 10%,  
**significant at 5%, ***significant at 1% 
 
Persistence increases with regime fixity for both classifications.
16 But even if this 
result is suggestive, the basic autoregressions in table 1 are obviously too crude to serve as an 
adequate way of estimating whether the exchange rate has an impact on the current account 
adjustment process. Next, the author re-runs the estimation for the whole data set and include 
the continuous regime variable (table 2). We observe a non-significant coefficient for the 
                                                 
16 The results are not overturned when the LYS classification with a range from 0 to 3 is considered. 
(5)   14
interaction term. All the results shown in tables 1 and 2 are similar to the ones Chinn and Wei 
report for the LYS classification. The coefficient we obtain for the lagged current account 
amounts to 0.736 and compares to the 0.747 they found in their study (2009, table 1 p. 15). 
Also, when the continuous regime variable and the interaction term are included, we end up 
with similar results for the lagged current account (0.708 to 0.680). More importantly, one 
does not find evidence for a difference in the rate of reversion according to higher degrees of 




Table 2: Current Account Persistence According to the Volatility Measure –  
Random Effects Panel Estimation 
 
  










REGIME   .062 
(.033)* 
















Notes: Dependent Variable: Current Account as % of GDP 
 
  An immediate problem with these regressions is that CAit-1 is correlated with the fixed 
effects in the error term, which gives rise to the “dynamic panel bias” (Nickel 1981). It 
inflates the coefficient for the lagged current account by attributing predictive power to it that 
actually belongs to the country’s fixed effect. Consider a country experiences a large negative 
current account shock for some reason not modeled in a year between 1970 and 2008, so that 
the shock appears in the error term. Ceteris paribus, the fixed effect of that country for the 
entire period, which is the deviation of its average unexplained current account from the 
sample average, will appear to be lower. In the following year, the lagged current account and 
the fixed effect will both be lower. Even though the impact of one year’s shock on the 




                                                 
17 Estimating the relationship using dummies according to the LYS classification yields similar results. 
18 See section 5.3.1 for details.   15
There are two ways to work around the endogeneity involved in our model. The first is 
to transform the data so as to remove the fixed effects. This corresponds to the basic approach 
used by Chinn and Wei (2009) as well as Herrmann (2009). In the following section, the 
author is going to focus on this way of estimating the relationship, since we first want to 
undertake a robustness check for the results that were laid out in previous work. The second 
possibility to take care of the endogeneity problem is to instrument CAit-1 and any other 
variable that might not be strictly endogenous with variables thought to be uncorrelated with 
the fixed effects.
19 The present analysis is going to discuss this second approach in more 
detail after having reviewed the results for the fixed effects estimations in chapter 5. 
Subsequently, the author employs a dynamic panel estimator following Blundell and Bond 
(1998).  
 
4.2. Fixed Effects Estimation 
 
4.2.1.  Does the Regime Variable Matter? 
 
At this stage, a model that is more appropriate than the naïve autoregressions of 
section 4.1 is estimated. The study continues by estimating the panel model using a FGLS 
estimator using fixed effects and panel corrected standard errors. This approach is comparable 
to the one proposed by Chinn and Wei, but uses the continuous volatility measure instead of 
discrete regime dummies. As a consequence of this estimation method, it is possible to test 
whether the outcome is overturned by the use of the alternative regime variable. Does the 
simple use of the z-score variable already produce different empirics than the polychotomous 
exchange rate regime variable or not?  
 
The first column of table 3 reports the results for the basic model (2) and the second 
column the ones for the augmented model (3). Results for both models including time effects 
are shown in column three and four. Time dummies are taken into account for two reasons. 
First, they serve as an additional robustness check. Second, results are displayed so as to 
ensure comparability to the alternative methodological approach laid out in section 5.4, where 
the inclusion of time dummies is crucial. The main conclusions are as follows. We do not find 
any evidence for faster adjustments of the current account for higher degrees of exchange rate 
                                                 
19  Even though Herrmann includes a robustness check incorporating an instrumental variable (IV) estimator 
according to Anderson and Hsiao (1982), she focuses mainly on the fixed effects estimator in her analysis. 
More importantly, this type of dynamic panel estimator has drawbacks when compared to others. This is laid 
out in section 5.4.2 of the present paper.   16
flexibility. The interaction term between the lagged current account and the exchange rate 
volatility exhibits inconsistent signs and is never statistically significant. As a result, the 
implied rate of reversion – which is around 0.32 for the basic model as measured by the 
autoregressive parameter 1 – does not depend on exchange rate fixity. This finding stands in 
contrast to Herrmann who found the opposite for her sample of 11 countries comprising 143 
observations. Overall, the additional control variables are in accord with our expectations and 
similar to the ones reported by Chinn and Wei.  
 








Basic Model With 
Time Effects 
 















































































Notes: Dependent Variable: Current Account as % of GDP 
 
In order to allow for heterogeneity in the sample, the panel is stratified into several 
subcategories. The paper uses a classification of countries into industrial countries, non-
industrial countries and non-industrial, non-oil exporting countries based on the IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook (WEO). As a means to double-check all of the following results for the 
smaller samples, results for the World Bank’s classification (WDI) of countries into high, 
medium, and low-income countries are reported in Annex A, as well. While table 4a reports 
the models without considering time dummies, 4b takes these effects into account. It seems to 
be important to allow for different rates of reversion. In the basic model, the autoregressive 
coefficient declines from around 0.78 for the industrial country group to about 0.65 for the 
non-industrial countries category. The same pattern is replicated for the augmented model.   17
Excluding oil exporters from the non-industrial group does not change the outcome. A similar 
interpretation applies to the estimations based on the World Bank’s classification: coefficients  
 
Table 4a: Current Account Adjustment – FGLS, by Country Groups (WEO) 
 






























































































755 2155  1853 2019 1722 
 
R
2 .77  .75  .59  .57  .60  .58 
 
Notes: Dependent Variable: Current Account as % of GDP 
 
 
Table 4b: Current Account Adjustment – FGLS (with time effects), by Country Groups (WEO) 
 




























































































Obs. 777  702  1930  1720  1807  1601 
 
R
2 .79  .79  .61  .58  .62  .58 
 
Notes: Dependent Variable: Current Account as % of GDP 
for the lagged current account are greater for countries with higher income (table 5, p. 41). It 
also appears to be instructive to stratify the sample into smaller subcategories with regard to   18
other variables than the autoregressive parameter. On the one hand, the results for the regime, 
trade, and inflation variables in the full sample seem to be driven by the non-industrial 
country group (WEO), and the medium to low income groups respectively (WDI). On the 
other hand, the coefficient for the finance interaction term appears to be dominated either by 
the industrial country group or the high-income countries, depending on the classification that 
is concerned. All results are independent of the inclusion of time dummies.  
 
The most important finding is, however, that the main conclusion of the present study 
remains unchanged for all subcategories. Again, we do not find any evidence for an increased 
speed in current account reversion for higher degrees of exchange rate flexibility. The 
coefficient for the interaction term between the lagged current account and the exchange rate 
volatility turns out to be continuously insignificant. A single exception poses the high-income 
group in table 5b (p. 41). Since this is only an isolated case for the augmented model with the 
inclusion of time dummies and the coefficient is only significant at the ten percent level, it 
does not alter the absence of any robust evidence in support of the “conventional wisdom”. 
Furthermore, signs for β2 are alternating across, and sometimes even within country groups.  
 
In short, we find no evidence for an impact of the exchange rate volatility on the 
current account adjustment process. That is, also if we measure the exchange rate regime 
based on the volatility variable, a more flexible exchange rate does not imply faster current 
account convergence. So far, the reported results confirm Chinn and Wei’s finding and 
suggest an absence of the effects as observed in Herrmann’s work for the larger data set. 
 
4.2.2.  Robustness of the “Conventional Wisdom” 
 
In the next step, we now want to check previous results by moving to the estimation 
based on equations (4) and (5). This can be seen as the most direct robustness test in our study 
of Herrmann’s conclusion in support of the predominant view, because it adopts essentially 
the same model specifications. At this stage, not only the alternative way of measuring the 
exchange rate regime is employed. As a reminder, the fundamental difference to previous 
estimations consists in lagging additionally all variables that might be endogenous. The 
regressors concerned are those involving the regime variable, as well as the trade and 
financial openness variables.  
   19
Table 6 replicates the results for the full sample that we saw before. Again, column 
one displays refers to the basic model and column two to the augmented model including 
other potential determinants of the current account adjustment. Column three and four show 
the results when time dummies are introduced into the equations. In total, the modification of 
the model on basis of endogeneity concerns does not yield contrary evidence to what we have 
seen before. The findings presented by Herrmann in support of the “conventional wisdom” 
does not hold true for the present study. Neither in the full sample, nor in the subsamples do 
the coefficients indicate faster current account convergence with increasing flexibility. The 
latter is verified in tables 7 (p. 23) and 8 (p. 42, Annex A).  
 








Basic Model With 
Time Effects 
 




















































Obs.  2784  2400 2567 2316 
 
R
2  .59 .60  .61  .60 
 
Notes: Dependent Variable: Current Account as % of GDP 
 
Interestingly, even if one fully adopts the same model specifications as Herrmann 
does, it does not alter the main conclusion. It primarily affects the additional control variables 
of the augmented model. They turn out to have no impact anymore. However, the estimations 
are no different to previous results with regard to the parameter of interest. As a consequence, 
Herrmann’s conjecture that “the different findings [as compared to Chinn and Wei] are not  Table 7a: Current Account Adjustment – FGLS (with lags), by Country Groups (WEO) 
 


























































































Obs. 821  727  1963  1673  1854  1572 
 
R
2 .75  .74  .53  .53  .53  .54 
 
Notes: Dependent Variable: Current Account as % of GDP 
 
 
Table 7b: Current Account Adjustment – FGLS (with lags and time effects), by Country Groups (WEO) 
 




























































































Obs. 882  786  1091  1009  594  521 
 
R
2 .69  .67  .57  .56  .57  .50 
 
Notes: Dependent Variable: Current Account as % of GDP 
 
 
only an issue of differences in the country  sample, rather the methodology used to 
control for the exchange rate regime seems to matter for the outcome” cannot be confirmed. 
Considering 
20  21
the present study study, it seems to support the view that the “conventional wisdom” is 
propagated as a truth with little justification or at least with insufficient empirical background. 
Following from this, one may suppose that instead of demonstrating a systematic causality 
between the exchange rate regime and the speed of current account adjustment, Hermann’s 
finding is rather due to her specific choice of the relatively small sample. This supposition is 
especially sustained by the fact that also the subcategories do not indicate any robust impact 
of the exchange rate regime. 
 
At this stage, we can assess the results of the first approach that tries to take care of the 
problem that CAit-1 is correlated with the fixed effects in the error term. When the data is 
transformed so as to eliminate the fixed effects by means of a FGLS estimator using fixed 
effects and panel corrected standard errors, the consequence is that we do not find evidence in 
favor of the “conventional wisdom”. As could be seen in this section, this finding is 
independent of the specific treatment of some additional variables as endogenous. In 
summary, there is reason to doubt that “the chosen sample may not be decisive for the 
outcome, and (...) the different methodologies used to classify the exchange rate regime may, 
to a considerable extent, account for the fact that our results are different compared with the 
outcome of Chinn and Wei” as Herrmann claims in her work (2009, p. 14). On the contrary, 
this study indicates that other factors of the 11 catching-up countries from central, eastern, 
and southeastern Europe account for the different assessment on the validity of the 
“conventional wisdom”.  
 
4.3. The Size of External Imbalances 
 
Can we claim with certainty an absence of a significant influence of the exchange rate 
flexibility on the speed of current account convergence? What is it then, that made the 
“conventional wisdom” conventional? In order to double-check the present “negative” 
finding, the present analysis points at convincing evidence supporting the “conventional 
wisdom” in the next part of the paper. In an unpublished draft, Ghosh et al. (2008, p. 6) argue 
that the size of external imbalances provides a more direct test of the claim that flexible 
exchange rates encourage corrective movements in the current account. Ex ante, we would 
expect higher imbalances for less flexible exchange rate regimes. Accordingly, the next Table 9a: Current Account Balances – De jure Classification (Ghosh), country groups (WEO) 
 
 




















Full Sample           
All  -3.804 9.844  3138  -6.857 8.862  2328  4.971  6.776  810 
Fixed  -4.569 11.426  1833  -7.875 10.177  1397  6.022  8.361  436 
Interm.  -2.834 6.871  771  -5.180 6.326  560  3.393  3.599  211 
FLoat  -2.575 6.962  534  -5.551 5.733  371  4.199  4.239  163 
Industrial           
All -.790  4.680  758  -3.440  3.158  462  3.347  3.529  296 
Fixed  -2.355 4.758  249  -4.366 3.841  176  2.494  2.897  73 
Interm. .010  4.456  306  -2.721  2.692  171  3.470  3.798  135 
Float -.076  4.451  203  -3.092  2.160  115  3.867  3.487  88 
Non-industrial           
All -4.764  10.816  2380  -7.702  9.588  1866  5.905  7.928  514 
Fixed  -4.917 12.110  1584  -8.381 10.694  1221  6.732  8.906  363 
Interm.  -4.706 7.513  465  -6.261 7.116  389  3.257  3.236  76 
FLoat  -4.108 7.744  331  -6.656 6.454  256  4.588  4.976  75 
Non-
Industrial/oil 
         
All  -5.331 9.039  2201  -7.728 8.056  1775  4.656  5.299  426 
Fixed  -5.609 9.671  1467  -8.356 8.490  1168  5.124  5.716  299 
Interm.  -4.983 7.609  419  -6.381 7.335  356  2.915  2.760  63 




Table 9b: Current Account Balances – De facto Classification (LYS), country groups (WEO) 
 
 




















Full Sample           
All  -3.586 8.950  3287  -6.897 7.362  2399  5.360  6.361  888 
Fixed -4.238  10.507  1921  -8.429  8.462  1374  6.291  7.276  547 
Interm.  -2.588 6.906  614  -5.413 5.561  440  4.557  4.343  174 
FLoat  -2.735 5.167  752  -4.415 4.197  585  3.150  3.745  167 
Industrial           
All -.274  4.969  714  -3.299  2.7645  419  4.022  4.178  295 
Fixed .112  5.237  332  -3.472  2.899  177  4.205  4.210  155 
Interm.  .581  5.934  139  -3.273  3.066 81 5.962  4.634 58 
Float  -1.290 3.673  243  -3.121 2.441  161  2.304  2.964  82 
Non-industrial           
All  -4.505 9.571  2573  -7.658 7.793  1980  6.026  7.116  593 
Fixed -5.146  11.090  1589  -9.162  8.763  1197  7.116  8.033  392 
Interm.  -3.515 6.900  475  -5.896 5.878  359  3.854  4.029  116 
FLoat  -3.425 5.619  509  -4.906 4.603  424  3.966  4.228  85 
Non-
Industrial/oil 
         
All  -5.171 9.044  2368  -7.772 7.916  1883  4.925  5.283  485 
Fixed -6.066  10.355  1458  -9.328  8.881  1141  5.674  5.762  317 
Interm.  -3.893 6.917  434  -6.029 6.011  338  3.627  4.064  96 
FLoat  -3.596 5.351  476  -4.835 4.610  404  3.358  3.626  72 
 
 
Notes: Means and Standard Errors reported as % of GDP 
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section examines the data by constructing tables that list the current account balances 
corresponding to different regimes. Because opposite signs cancel each other out when 
looking at the average current account balance only, separate columns for surpluses and 
deficits are included. Again, the de jure classification by Ghosh et al. (2003) and the de facto 
classification by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003a) are used to categorize regimes. 
Moreover, the panel is stratified along the WEO and the WDI country groups. The results are 
displayed in tables 9 (WEO, p. 25) and 10 (WDI, p. 43). 
 
One basic pattern is common to all of the tables: they show very consistently that, on 
average, absolute current account balances as percent of GDP are substantially larger for fixed 
regimes than for more flexible ones. In addition, the size of absolute deviations rises when 
moving from floating to fixed. Mean values of the current account balances for the fixed 
category are greater than the mean values for all regime types taken together (“Fixed” vs. 
“All”). This holds true for the full sample, as well as the subcategories.
20 Due to the canceling 
out of opposite signs, it is important to note that the finding is not overthrown by looking at 
the columns for surpluses and deficits separately. Here, the figures exhibit the same 
distribution, as magnitudes are higher for both deficits and surpluses in fixed regimes.  
 
When comparing not only the fixed category to the overall average, but also different 
categories among each other, the relation between the fixed category and the most flexible 
one is unequivocal. Mean values in the fixed category are systematically higher than the ones 
for “Float”. Furthermore, it can be noted that the relation between the intermediate category 
and the floating category is less clear. Although, by and large, figures are smaller for floating 
regimes, the relationship changes for some subsamples. This can be seen in some of the 
country groups of the de jure measure. Overall, the results of the de facto measure accord 
better with the assumption that less flexible regimes are associated with higher imbalances, 
for the LYS classification shows incremental increases in mean values and standard 
deviations even when moving from floating to intermediate. It must be noted, however, that 
this relationship is not of primary interest for the present study. The main conclusion of both 
tables is that fixed exchange rates are associated with larger external positions. This finding 
applies to all country groups and is independent of the exchange rate classification we use. 
                                                 
20  A seeming exception to this pattern is the industrial country group in table 9b and the high-income group in 
table 10b respectively. If we take a look at the columns for deficits and surpluses, however, it becomes clear 
that this is due to the canceling out of the two figures, which are taken for themselves both greater for fixed 
regimes.   24
Hence, this may provide reason to belief in the validity of the predominant view. It is 
reasonable to assume that larger sizes of trade balances are, on average, caused by greater 
current account persistence. The alternative explanation that systematically larger external 
positions accumulate much faster under fixed regimes without showing a higher degree of 
persistence is highly disputable. Moreover, it offers a good explanation for the historical 
examples from the beginning of the paper by demonstrating the same characteristics of these 
individual cases also for the whole period from 1970 to 2008. 
 
Now, after having checked the negative assessment of the “conventional wisdom “ by 
means of a different – albeit much simpler – method than estimating the rate of current 
account reversion, one might ask whether the predominant view really rests on a false belief. 
Doesn’t the fact that fixed exchange rates are associated with systematically larger imbalances 
indicate that we should be able to find a robust relationship between current account 
persistence and the exchange rate regime? Why doesn’t the disparate behavior of trade 
balances depending on different regimes show to be robust in the estimations? As a 
consequence of previous results, the author reconsiders the estimation methods employed so 
far in the next part of the paper and proposes an alternative way of how to estimate the issue 
under consideration. 
 
4.4. Dynamic Panel Estimation 
 
 
The model specifications as laid out in chapter 2 stand closely in line with the ones 
proposed by Chinn and Wei, as well as the ones used in the work by Herrmann. The main 
features were that a continuous regime variable is used instead of discrete dummy variables 
and that we tried to work around the issue of endogeneity by means of a fixed effects 
estimation. In the following course, the author adheres to the use of the z-score variable, since 
there is nothing inherently wrong with this way of measuring the exchange rate regime. As 
could be seen in chapter 2, it is not dissimilar to other well-established classifications, but 
yields the advantage of a more accurate measurement due to the finer distinction. By contrast, 
the paper wants to re-evaluate the use of the FGLS estimation for the issue at hand. 
 4.4.1.  Endogeneity 
 
As we have seen throughout the course of the analysis, endogeneity is the obvious, but 
at the same time also the most problematic issue of our econometric model. The current 
account adjustment process depends on the difference between the country-specific long-run 
equilibrium that we assume and the previous year’s actual level, which argues for a dynamic 
model in which lags of the dependent variable are also regressors. Additionally, supposing 
that the exchange rate is only a determinant of the current account, but movements in the trade 
balance do not have an impact on the exchange rate regime would be dubious.
21 This is 
particularly true, if the exchange rate regime is measured by a volatility measure. Thus, there 
exists a trade-off between the more accurate measurement of the exchange rate regime 
behavior and the endogeneity issue. Herrmann acknowledges this fact when she writes: “The 
z-scores measure of de facto exchange rate volatility proposed by Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf 
(2003) reflects the actual behavior of the exchange rate regime more precisely than a discrete 
variable. Furthermore, we avoid the problems inherent to a dummy variable approach which 
are insignificant results and an arbitrary classification of the dummies especially for 
intermediate regimes etc. On the other hand, this approach may increase the endogeneity 
problem, implying that in periods of rapid current account adjustment, greater exchange rate 
volatility may be observed.” (p. 3).  
 
Until now, it was tried to take care of the endogeneity issue by transforming the data 
such that the fixed effects are removed. The problem is that this does not eliminate the 
dynamic panel bias (Nickel 1981).
22 One of the regressors, the lagged independent variable 
CAit-1, is still correlated with the error term after the transformation. Following Roodman 









(i2 ...iT). The 
problem in the discussion is that the CAit-1 term in CAit1




* while, symmetrically, the - 1
T 1
CAit and itare also correlated. What is even more 
problematic is that the continuing endogeneity cannot be eliminated by instrumenting CAit1
*  
with lags of CAit1, because they are also included in the transformed error it
*. We take this 
problem serious by adopting an alternative way of estimating the model. In order to remove 
                                                 
21 Similarly, Pan (2006) shows that movements of the current account help forecast exchange rates. 
22 See Annex C for details. 
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the dynamic panel bias the author performs a different transformation of the data. Since the 
first-difference transformation has the weakness of magnifying the gaps in unbalanced 
panels,
23 a System generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator developed by Blundell 
and Bond (1998) is employed. 
 
4.4.2.  Estimation Results 
 
The estimator is specifically designed for panel analysis. The present model fits the 
prerequisites, as laid out in Roodman (2006, p. 15), extraordinarily well. First of all, we 
consider a dynamic process, with current realizations of the dependent variable influenced by 
past ones. Moreover, there are arbitrarily distributed fixed effects, which argues in favor of a 
panel set-up. Thirdly, some variables are endogenous. Endogenous variables are potentially 
correlated with past and present errors. In the present case, this holds particularly true for the 
exchange rate volatility measure. What is more, the idiosyncratic disturbances (apart from the 
fixed effects) have country-specific patterns of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Also, 
some regressors like the lagged current account are predetermined but not strictly exogenous, 
i.e. they are independent of current disturbances, but influenced by past ones. Furthermore, 
our data set is a panel with moderately large N and moderately small T. Lastly, we lack 
“good” instruments: the only ones available are based on the lags of the instrumented 
variables. In short, the estimator fits extremely well to the issue that is being investigated. The 
only point which might not be completely fulfilled is the desirable property that the 
idiosyncratic disturbances are uncorrelated across countries. Section 5.4.3 is going to come 
back to this problem.  
 
Using the dynamic panel estimation method, the lagged dependent variable CAit1 is 
instrumented, just like any other similarly endogenous variable, as well. The simplest way of 
incorporating either CAit-2 or ∆CAit-2 as instruments for CAit1
*  is with Two Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS), which yields the Anderson-Hsiao (1982) difference and levels estimator.
24 
However, as demonstrated in Roodman (2006, p. 4ff.), 2SLS is only efficient under the 
hypothesis of homoskedasticity. The present paper follows an approach fully developed in 
Blundell and Bond (1998) to increase efficiency. The rationale for this choice is sustained by 
                                                 
23Cf. Roodman (2006), p. 20 and Blundell and Bond (1998), p. 115 
24  Herrmann makes use of an instrumental variable (IV) estimator according to the Anderson-Hsiao (1982) 
estimator in order to provide a robustness check for her results (cf. p. 12)   27
the fact that first-differencing, as an alternative way of dealing with the dynamic panel bias, 
“has been found to have large finite sample bias” (Blundell and Bond 1998, p. 115). In 
addition, instruments become weaker when the autoregressive parameter increases towards 
unity. The latter is particularly true for the given model, as could be seen in previous 
estimations. The estimator uses lagged differences of the endogenous variables as instruments 
to make them exogenous to the fixed effects, since lagged levels are weak instruments in the 
differenced equations whenever 1 is close to unity.
25 This approach basically means that we 
assume changes in the instrumenting variables to be uncorrelated with the fixed effects. For 
this study, it follows that we instrument CAit-1 with ∆CAit-1 and variables including our 
exchange rate volatility measure accordingly (i.e. Regimeit and CAit-1*Regimeit).  
 
Within our context, there is the risk of over-identifying restrictions. The System GMM 
estimator can easily generate large amounts of moment conditions, with the instrument count 
quadratic in the time dimension of the panel, T. Finite samples sometimes lack adequate 
information to estimate such large matrices. Thus, the estimation reports two tests of whether 
the instruments appear exogenous as a group (Sargan and Hansen statistics). Yet, the Sargan 
statistic should be disregarded, because is not robust to heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation. 
Conversely, the Hansen statistic is robust and should be considered instead. Nevertheless, it 
has its own drawback, since it can be greatly weakened by instrument proliferation to the 
point where it generates implausibly good p-values of 1.000 (Anderson and Sørenson 1996, 
Bowsher 2002, cit. in: Roodman 2006, p. 14).  
 
Taking everything into account, the System GMM estimator is more suitable than the 
fixed effects estimation for the issue at hand, but it should not be relied on when the number 
of instruments is large relative to the number of observations (although it is still consistent in 
these cases). Unfortunately, there exists no clear-cut definition on how many instruments is 
“too many”. In this study, we disregard cases where Stata displays a warning that the number 
of instruments might be too large relative to the number of observations and/or we obtain a p-
value of 1.000 for the Hansen statistic.  
 
Table 11 reports the outcome of the System generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimator. Column one displays the results for the basic model and the second column the 
                                                 
25 Cf. Blundell and Bond (1998), p. 123   28
ones for the augmented model. Columns three to eight display the outcome for both equations 
when stratifying the panel along the WEO country groups. By taking a look at the Hansen 
statistic, one can recognize that the regression for the industrial country group seems to be 
over-identified. Results for this category are reported for the sake of completeness and in 
order to maintain the same mode of representation only. The same is true for the WDI country 
group classification.
26 Yet, the problem does not arise for the other two subsamples of table 
11. They, in turn, yield valuable results for the present examination. All estimations include 
time dummies. 
 
Table 11: Current Account Adjustment – Dynamic Panel Estimations, Country Groups (WEO) 
 




























































































































Obs.  2514 2275  766  697  1748 1578 1650 1484 
Instruments  132 138 132  138 132 138 132 138 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(1) 
P>z=.000 P>z=.000 P>z=.000  P>z=.000 P>z=.000 P>z=.000 P>z=.000 P>z=.000 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(2) 





















Notes: Dependent Variable: Current Account as % of GDP 
 
The main conclusions of table 11 are as follows. Most importantly, it reveals that a 
greater degree of exchange rate flexibility (as measured by the exchange rate volatility) 
facilitates faster adjustment of the current account. The autoregressive parameter moves 
within the same margin as before, with around 0.723 for the full sample and lower figures for 
the non-industrial country groups. Contrary to what we have seen in previous fixed effects 
estimations, the adjustment process now depends on the exchange rate volatility. Considering 
                                                 
26 Likewise, the same issue arises for the WDI classification.   29
the interaction term between the lagged current account and the exchange rate regime 
variable, the autoregressive parameter declines from 0.723 to 0.598 in the basic model (CAit-1 
+ CAit-1*Regimeit). The coefficient of interest turns out to be negative and is highly 
statistically significant for all relevant cases. Thus, greater exchange rate volatility decreases 
current account persistence. Another way to put it is that the implied rate of reversion is 
higher for flexible regimes. Whereas the exchange rate volatility measure equals zero for a 
totally fixed regime and its rate of reversion amounts to 0.277, it increases along greater 
magnitudes of exchange rate flexibility. The effect is even more pronounced when we account 
for additional determinants of the current account adjustment by the inclusion of 
supplementary control variables. The non-industrial country group replicates the same pattern 
of the full sample. As shown in column five, current account persistence declines from 0.663 
for totally fixed regimes to 0.542 when considering the interaction term. Again, the results are 
not overthrown by the inclusion of additional controls. Furthermore, excluding oil-exporting 
countries does not change the outcome.  
 
By and large, the control variables behave according to the expectations and are never 
contrary to them whenever they are statistically distinct from zero. The Arellano-Bond tests 
check for autocorrelation aside from the fixed effects. They are applied to the residuals in 
differences. Since ∆it is mathematically related to ∆it −1 via the shared it −1 term, negative 
first-order serial correlation is expected in differences and evidence of it is uninformative. 
Thus, we focus on second-order correlation in differences to check for first-order serial 
correlation in levels, because this will detect correlation between the it −1 in ∆it  and the it −2 
in ∆it −2.
27 The Arellano-Bond AR(2) test statistic does not indicate a misspecification and 
justifies the use of second lags and larger for the endogenous variables.  
 
In summary, we obtain a fundamentally different result than previous fixed effects 
estimations when the relationship is modeled according to the System GMM estimator. 
Arguably, the latter is more germane to the question of whether more flexible exchange rate 
regimes are conducive to the adjustment of current account imbalances. If the relationship is 
estimated in a way that we fully correct the dynamic panel bias while additionally taking into 
account heteroskedasticity, serial correlation of disturbances, and a moderately large 
autoregressive parameter, we come to a conclusion that stands in line with the “conventional 
                                                 
27See Roodman (2006), p. 35   30
wisdom”. In other words, it provides robust empirical evidence for the predominant view that 
more flexible exchange rate regimes exhibit faster current account convergence than less 
flexible regimes. The finding fills an important gap for a lot of policy recommendations by 
buttressing them with empirical background. Also, because a sizable number of countries over 
a period of 38 years are concerned, our study discloses a causality that seems to be fairly 
general.  
 
4.4.3.  Discussing the Results 
 
In this part of the paper, three potential sources of criticism are made out and tried to 
answer one at a time. First, one might argue that a weakness of the alternative estimation 
method the paper proposes would be the difficulty to scrutinize smaller data sets such as the 
industrial country group. As could be seen, the issue of over-identification emerges for this 
group. The dynamic panel estimator, which is arguably the most appropriate for our purpose, 
is not applicable for small data sets when trying to fully take care of the endogeneity issue by 
instrumenting all potentially endogenous variables. Reducing the number of instruments 
instead of increasing the number of observations so as to consider smaller samples is not 
possible without changing the fundamental specifications of the model. As laid out above, 
there is good reason to instrument both regime variables and the lagged current account; 
treating one not as endogenous simply to reduce instruments would not be justified.
28 At that 
point, the reader should keep in mind that the question under investigation is a general one. 
We should not be gratuitously concerned with the fact that we are not able to derive 
statements that apply only to specific countries and/or limited time scopes. The principal 
motivation of the present undertaking was to test economic theory, which essentially suggests 
that inflexible exchange rates tend to promote the accumulation of imbalances which might 
entail deviations from market equilibrium. For the issue at hand, the paper is confident to 
claim that the System GMM estimator is superior to other estimation methods on basis of the 
considerations described in the previous section. Another point that mitigates concerns about 
the unreliability for the industrial country group is the finding made by Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2003b). In their work, they demonstrate that the exchange rate regime is 
relevant in an emerging market context, but not for industrial countries. Here, the present 
estimations are reliable for the non-industrial country sample.  
                                                 
28 The “collapse” command is used in all estimations to reduce the proliferation of instruments. See Section 4.1 in 
Roodman (2006) for the detailed syntax of the estimator.   31
 
Secondly, it was already mentioned that the estimator requires the idiosyncratic 
disturbances to be uncorrelated across individuals. In the present context, however, it is 
reasonable to assume a certain type of cross-individual correlation, i.e. contemporaneous 
correlation. In the case of contemporaneous correlation, the disturbances are correlated 
between the panel units in the same period. Consider for example a large exogenous shock on 
the economy of one country. Countries which maintain close trade relations to that country 
might also be affected instantaneously in the same period via their trade balances. Yet, as 
shown in Roodman (2006, p. 34ff.), contemporaneous correlation is prevented by the use of 
time dummies. The assumption of no correlation across countries holds with the inclusion of 
time effects. Since time dummies are included in all of the estimations, this fact does not pose 
a reason for concern.  
 
A third criticism that might be advanced is that it is not possible to instrument the 
trade and finance variables of the augmented model in addition to the regime variables. In part 
4.2.2 of the present work, the author followed Herrmann in her model specification that 
considered the two determinants to be potentially endogenous. Under the System GMM 
estimator, this would render the results to be invalid, since the number of instruments would 
be too high relative to the number of observations. This problem cannot be easily corrected. It 
must be noted, however, that the treatment of these two variables as endogenous did not yield 
any different results in previous estimations than without their special consideration. 
Throughout the study, conclusions on the coefficients of interest were never overthrown by 
the inclusion of additional controls, regardless of their treatment as exogenous or endogenous. 
Estimations for the augmented model did not indicate an omittance of determinants that 
would have fundamentally altered the relationship. Therefore, even if the two additional 
control variables cannot be treated as endogenous in order to provide another robustness test, 
one should not overestimate their importance for the main conclusions of the study. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
 
 
In this paper, the impact of the exchange rate regime flexibility on the current account 
adjustment process was investigated. For the ongoing debate on potentially dangerous 
external positions, an exact understanding of this mechanism is crucial. Starting from the 
position which is predominantly assumed to be true, i.e. the view that flexible exchange rate   32
regimes facilitate current account adjustments, and the surprisingly little empirical research 
supporting it, the paper demonstrated new systematic evidence supporting the “conventional 
wisdom”.  
 
The first part of the study provided a short overview over two pertinent works by 
Chinn and Wei (2009) on the one hand, and Herrmann (2009) on the other hand. As one could 
see in section 2.1, it was not possible to make out the decisive reason for their contrary 
findings due to two essential difficulties. First, their data sets differ too greatly in size and 
scope. Second, the models they use in order to estimate the relationship diverge importantly in 
their specifications. By the application of the same methodology to a data set comprising 171 
countries for the 1970 to 2008 period, it was possible to test previous results on a large scale 
and pointed out that the specific choice of the sample instead of the different methodological 
approaches is more likely to have resulted in the opposing conclusions. As the fixed effects 
estimations revealed, the “conventional wisdom” did not seem to be robust on a larger scale, 
thereby confirming Chinn and Wei’s “negative” finding.  
 
By taking into account the size of external imbalances, the assessment of the fixed 
effects results left room for doubt that the predominant view should be rejected once and for 
all. It was shown that fixed exchange rate regimes are systematically associated with larger 
external positions than other types of regimes. Triggered by this, the author re-evaluated the 
use of a fixed effects estimator for the issue at hand and pointed to its fundamental 
weaknesses with respect to the dynamic panel bias. Following, the paper argues in favor of a 
dynamic panel estimator, the System GMM estimator developed in Blundell and Bond 
(1998), because there exist good reason to believe that this estimation method is more 
germane to the relationship under investigation. This was demonstrated in sections 5.4.1 and 
5.4.2. Once this dynamic panel estimation was applied to the model of interest, we obtained 
essentially different results to the ones the fixed effects estimations produced. Now, a strong 
and robust relationship between exchange rate regimes and adjustment speed of current 
accounts could be observed. From the author’s point of view, due to the structural advantages 
of the System GMM estimator, these latter results should be considered instead of any fixed 
effects estimations.  
 
The present paper contributes to the ongoing debate on global imbalances by 
providing new empirical evidence in support of the view that greater exchange rate flexibility   33
acts conducive to current account adjustments. In an area where the discussed implications for 
the world economy are far-reaching and the empirical research very little, this finding fills an 
important gap. A concrete policy implication of the present study is that, on a global scale, 
more exchange rate flexibility is needed in order to promote a smooth unwinding of today’s 
current account imbalances. The Asian countries, China in particular, will have to 
acknowledge the limitations of export-led growth, establishing sustainable growth on a 
broader basis than a unique focus on the sector of traded goods. A higher exchange rate 
flexibility, which is inevitable, will be good for the adjustment of today’s imbalances. 
However, the revaluation of the renminbi should be gradual, since it would otherwise risk to 
kill the “golden goose of economic growth” (Eichengreen 2007, p. 119) thereby harming the 
world economy as a whole.
29 Bordo (2003, p. 32 f.) highlights that successful floating by 
today’s advanced countries required achieving financial maturity. The same will be required 
for the rest of the world. In order to achieve an abatement of imbalances in areas where a 
higher degree of exchange rate flexibility is not possible, such as the European Union, more 
coordination and integration with respect to fiscal policy would be desirable. 
                                                 
29  Similarly, Huang (2010) and Huang and Kunyu (2010) argue that global economic growth would be about 1.5 
percentage points lower if China revalued its currency.   34
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ANNEX 
A. Additional Tables 
 
 
 Table 5a: Current Account Adjustment – FGLS, by Country Groups (WDI) 
 


























































































Obs. 980  855  1318  1163  702  590 
 
R
2  .68 .66 .60  .59 .57 .53 
 
Notes: Dependent Variable: Current Account as % of GDP 
 
Table 5b: Current Account Adjustment – FGLS (with time effects), by Country Groups (WDI) 
 




























































































Obs. 903  795  1178  1080  626  547 
 
R
2  .70 .66 .64  .62 .61 .54 
 
Notes: Dependent Variable: Current Account as % of GDP   39
Table 8a: Current Account Adjustment – FGLS (with lags), by Country Groups (WDI) 
 


























































































Obs. 942  816  1193  1044  649  540 
 
R
2 .68  .67  .52  .52  .54  .52 
 
Notes: Dependent Variable: Current Account as % of GDP 
 
Table 8b: Current Account Adjustment – FGLS (with lags and time effects), by Country Groups (WDI) 
 




























































































Obs. 882  786  1091  1009  594  521 
 
R
2  .69 .67 .57  .56 .57 .50 
 
Notes: Dependent Variable: Current Account as % of GDP 
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Table 10a: Current Account Balances – De jure Classification (Ghosh), country groups (WDI) 
 




















Full Sample           
All  -3.804 9.844  3138  -6.857 8.862  2328  4.971  6.776  810 
Fixed  -4.569 11.426  1833  -7.875 10.177  1397  6.022  8.361  436 
Interm.  -2.834 6.871  771  -5.180 6.326  560  3.393  3.599  211 
FLoat  -2.575 6.962  534  -5.551 5.733  371  4.199  4.239  163 
High Income           
All -.677  11.256  912  -4.677  11.213  546  5.290  8.298  366 
Fixed  -1.532 16.272  396  -6.629 15.843  259  8.105  12.240  137 
Interm. .0298  4.445  306  -2.704  2.691  170  3.448  3.793  136 
Float -.095  4.534  210  -3.222  2.357  117  3.838  3.408  93 
Medium Income          
All  -4.516 9.490  1400  -7.494 8.471  1068  5.061  5.357  332 
Fixed -4.927  10.918  867  -8.844  9.671  634  5.729  5.814  233 
Interm.  -3.716 6.044  350  -5.121 5.476  291  3.213  3.341  59 
FLoat  -4.100 7.267  183  -6.337 6.330  143  3.894  4.082  40 
Low Income           
All  -6.048 7.688  826  -7.570 6.934  714  3.657  4.531  112 
Fixed  -6.135 6.785  570  -7.297 6.220  504  2.734  3.636  66 
Interm.  -7.769  10.258  115  -9.606  9.828 99 3.596  2.923 16 
FLoat  -4.290 8.366  141  -6.995 6.655  111  5.721  6.179  30 
 
 
Notes: Means and Standard Errors reported as % of GDP 
 
Table 10b: Current Account Balances – De facto Classification (LYS), country groups (WDI) 
 




















Full Sample           
All  -3.586 8.950  3287  -6.897 7.362  2399  5.360  6.361  888 
Fixed -4.238  10.507  1921  -8.429  8.462  1374  6.291  7.276  547 
Interm.  -2.588 6.906  614  -5.413 5.561  440  4.557  4.343  174 
FLoat  -2.735 5.167  752  -4.415 4.197  585  3.150  3.745  167 
High Income           
All -.155  7.860  911  -4.390  4.753  528  5.684  7.553  383 
Fixed .072  9.548  522  -5.475  5.789  286  6.795  8.869  236 
Interm.  .788  5.772  142  -3.141  2.928 79 5.716  4.543 63 
Float  -1.177 3.834  247  -3.093 2.422  163  2.539  3.308  84 
Medium Income          
All  -4.593 9.788  1584  -7.894 8.583  1192  5.444  5.404  392 
Fixed -5.700  11.951  880  -10.349  10.322  635  6.350  5.968  245 
Interm.  -3.321 6.368  342  -5.561 5.303  261  3.894  3.514  81 
FLoat  -3.104 5.223  362  -4.685 3.942  296  3.984  4.308  66 
Low Income           
All  -5.517 7.118  792  -7.096 6.168  679  3.972  4.649  113 
Fixed  -6.093 7.027  519  -7.603 5.961  453  4.268  4.637  66 
Interm.  -4.344 8.119  130  -6.822 7.094  100  3.913  5.454  30 
FLoat  -4.490 6.222  143  -5.491 5.865  126  2.928  2.911  17 
 
 
Notes: Means and Standard Errors reported as % of GDP   41
B. Additional Figures 
 





























LYS (0-3)   42
C. Properties of the error term under the Within Groups transformation 


















 ; likewise for CAit
*, CAit1
*  etc. 
 
Variance of the error term it
*:     E[it
*2] E[(it i)
2] 
































                     





















Thus, the error terms are negatively correlated after the transformation. Interestingly, this 
holds true even if the disturbances were uncorrelated before. The correlation coefficient 
between it
* and it-1
* amounts to: 










































We see that the serial correlation decreases with increasing T. Simulations by Judson and 
Owen (1999) show, however, a bias equal to 20% of the coefficient of interest even when 
T=30. 
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D. List of Variables 
 
Variables mentioned in the text are capital. 
 
CI    Chinn and Ito (2008), http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/kaopen_2007.xls 
GH  Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2003), their data can be found on a CD enclosed in 
the book 
IFS    International Financial Statistics Database (IMF) 
LYS  Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), 
http://profesores.utdt.edu/~ely/Base_2005.zip 
WDI    World Development Indicators (World Bank) 




Definition Unit  Source 
CA/GDP 
 








FINANCE Chinn/Ito  index KAOPEN of financial 
liberalization  
 
See Chinn and Ito 
(2008) for details* 
 
CI 




variable (range: 0-2) 
 
GH 
High-Inc.  High income country, value 1 if 











Ind. Industrial  country,  value 1 if country is 










it  Nominal Effective Exchange Rate, 
average monthly growth 
 
Percent per month 
(decimal fraction) 
IFS 
 it  Nominal Effective Exchange Rate, 
standard deviation of monthly growth 
 
Percent per month 
(decimal fraction) 
IFS 
Low-Inc.  Low income country, value 1 if country 




WDI   44




variable (range: 0-2) 
 
LYS 
Medium-Inc.  Medium income country, value 1 if 







Non-Ind.  Non-industrial country, value 1 if 






Oil-Exp.  Oil-exporting country, value 1 if 






REGIME (zit)  Nominal Effective Exchange Rate, sum 
of absolute average and standard 
deviation of monthly growth  
 
Percent per month 
(decimal fraction) 
IFS 
TRADE  Sum of exports and imports as percent 
of GDP 





* KAOPEN is the first principal component of four indices, based on the binary dummy 
variables that codify the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border ﬁnancial transactions 
reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions; in order to simplify interpretation, this variable is adjusted such that the 
minimum value is zero, i.e., KAOPEN ranges between zero and some positive value. 
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E. List of Countries 
 
Afghanistan, I.R. of 
Albania 
Algeria 





Azerbaijan, Rep. of 
Bahamas, The 




































































































































St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Lucia 
























Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 
Vietnam 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 